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BIG BROTHER HEARS YOU, BUT CAN HE UNDERSTAND
WHAT HE HEARS? THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF
CALEA TO VOIP COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF
ENCRYPTION
Timothy Singleton*
Because of advances in telecommunications networks, the introduction and
deployment of new digitally-based technologies, services and features, law
enforcement's ability to conduct court authorized surveillance is being
threatened... the costs incurred to remove this threat to public safety and
national security pale in comparison to the devastating economic impact, as well
as the loss of life, if law enforcement's wiretapping efforts continue to be
hampered by technological impediments.
-Louis J. Freeh, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of
the line is invaded, and all conversations between them upon any subject, and
although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard... As a means
of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments
of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping.
-Justice Brandeis, regarding wiretapping as violative of the Fourth and
Fifth amendments
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1. Wiretapping Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 2, 4-5 (1994) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (majority
opinion held wiretapping did not violate the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the
Fourth Amendment or the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) performing
investigations on suspected technologically savvy terrorists. The terrorists use
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology, such as Skype or Vonage, to
make telephone calls. The FBI agents install a wiretap through the
telecommunications company and listen to the terrorist calls. With the help of
this electronic surveillance the FBI is able to obtain information on terrorist
locations, meetings, and plans. Using this information, the FBI is able to
circumvent a terrorist attack. Now imagine the terrorists encrypting their VoIP
calls. Because of encryption, instead of critical information, the FBI is left with
a judicially approved wiretap that renders no evidence other than garbled trash.
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) offers communication over the Internet
similar to normal telephone calls, 3 and as VoIP usage grows, the threat of
criminal and terrorist activity employing this technology substantially increases.
4
The technological advances in the form and function of telephony have begun to
reflect the age of the current wiretap legislation in the United States. 5 The
problems of effective wiretapping facing the government carry in their shadow
issues of personal privacy. The United Kingdom's approach differs
substantially from that of the United States; however, examining some aspects of
the British method may prove essential to a considered and effective
refurbishment of United States law.
Even though the implementation of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) 7 to managed VoIP systems will afford law
enforcement entities some wiretap capabilities, the law is not focused enough to
adequately fulfill its proposed function and must be amended to reflect the
fundamental differences in the technology used by modern telecommunications
providers. This comment analyzes the potential privacy issues and the problems
of packet switched networks, peer-to-peer communications, and encryption as
3. FCC, VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.fcc.gov/voip/.
4. Declan McCullagh, Feds: VoIP a Potential Haven for Terrorists, ZDNET NEWS, Jun. 16,
2004 http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009-5236233.html.
5. See Jason Hill, The Storm Ahead: How CALEA will turn VolP on its Head I (Kennesaw,
Ga., Sept. 22-23, 2006) (Proceedings of the 2006 Information Security Curriculum Development
Conference) (copy of paper on file with the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law),
available at http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1240000/1231079/p147-
hill.pdf?key 1 = 1231079&key2=0465707021 &coll=GUIDE&dI=GUIDE&CFID=22450962&CFT
OKEN=71691155.
6. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, CALEA: THE PERILS OF WIRETAPPING THE
INTERNET, http://www.eff.org/issues/calea (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
7. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2006).
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they apply to government wiretapping in the era of VoIP communications.
Section II offers an overview of the nature of telephone and Internet
communications. Section III provides a discussion of the basics of encryption
and its application in VoIP. Section IV addresses a brief history of wiretapping,
wiretap legislation in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe, and the
Fourth Amendment issues associated with wiretapping. Section V argues the
problems facing CALEA's implementation, including tracking communication
information across packet switched networks, the difficulty of tracking peer-to-
peer communications, and timely deciphering encrypted data streams. Section
VI compares and contrasts the methods of wiretapping in the United States and
the United Kingdom and analyzes the need for careful wiretapping legislation.
Section VII discusses suggested solutions to the balance of privacy and security.
Section VIII concludes by proposing that CALEA, as applied to VoIP
communications, will cause more problems with implementation and privacy
concerns than it will solve, and therefore should not be applied to VoIP without
carefully considered changes to its implementation.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE PUBLIC SWITCH TELEPHONE NETWORK AND
VOICE OVER INTERNET PROTOCOL
A. The Public Switch Telephone Network Structure
The Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) is the network through
which all conventional telephone calls are routed. 8 The PSTN and VoIP have
different architectures which lead to increased difficulty in tapping the varying
forms of VoIP communication.9 To understand the differences between
wiretapping traditional wireline and IP communications, it is necessary to
introduce the differences between their architectures. The telephone network is
based on the creation of physical or logical circuits between the two parties of a
conversation.10 A circuit switched network, like the PSTN, requires that the
destination and source, the caller and the person being called, be connected by a
circuit before communication can take place."I The circuit between the two
parties to the call functions as a direct cable between the parties without
8. LILLIAN GOLENIEWSKI, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ESSENTIALS: THE COMPLETE GLOBAL
SOURCE 103 (Kitty Wilson Jarrett ed., Addison-Wesley 2d ed. 2007) (2006).
9. STEVEN BELLOVIN ET AL., SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING THE COMMUNICATIONS
ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT TO VOICE OVER IP, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 5 (2006), http://www.itaa.org/isec/docs/CALEAVOlPreport.pdf.
10. See GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 100.
11. OLIVER C. IBE, CONVERGED NETWORK ARCHITECTURES: DELIVERING VOICE OVER IP, ATM,
AND FRAME RELAY 2 (Margaret Eldridge ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002).
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interruption. 12 Once established, the circuit provides negligible delay and a high
quality of service. 13 The delay experienced in telephone traffic is the delay in
time it takes the signal to travel from one party to the other and is not noticeable
to most subscribers.' 4 Individual subscribers connect to the telephone network
via their local loop, the last length of cable between the actual telephone and the
larger network lines. 15  This loop connects to the switching nodes that route
traffic through the network. 16 Switching nodes create the circuit which stretches
from the local loop of the caller across several switching nodes, and finally end
at the local loop of the call recipient. 17
Early wiretaps were often connected at the local loop, directly to the copper
wire between the dwelling or business and the main telephone line. 18  This
allowed the listener to catch all the information passing through the loop, but no
information that stopped or was redirected at or before the switch. 19 Because
forwarded calls are redirected at the switch, never passing through the loop, a
wiretap could not access a forwarded call. When call forwarding is applied,
for instance to a tapped phone line, the calls are transferred to another designated
number. 2 1 Call forwarding applied to a tapped phone circumvents the wiretap
entirely and allows for conversations free from government eavesdropping.
By the early 1990s, the leaps in telecommunications technology, such as fiber
optic cables, wireless connections, and digital stored program control switches,
made line wiretapping an inefficient way to conduct court-ordered wiretapping
since it depended almost entirely on antiquated analog switching and copper
wires to function properly. 23
12. Id.
13. See id.; see also GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 100.
14. See GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 89.
15. IBE, supra note 8, at 14 ("The access network between a subscriber's telephone and the
[central office] is called the local loop (or the last mile).... Wireless local loop, which uses radio
links rather than physical wire, is becoming increasingly available.").
16. GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 111.
17. See id. at 7-8.
18. BELLOVIN ETAL.,supra note 9, at 5.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See AT&T, User Guide Call Forwarding,
http://wwwOl.sbc.com/ProductsServices/Residential/1,409-5-3-0,00.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2008).
22. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5.
23. See Wiretapping Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of A. Richard Metzger, Jr.,
Deputy Chief Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission) [hereinafter
Metzger].
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B. Voice Over Internet Protocol Structure
VoIP is a large and growing market for telecommunications. 24 In the third
quarter of 2007, Vonage boasted 2.446 million subscriber lines. 25 By the end of
September 2005, Skype claimed more than 100 million registered users.26 One
market analysis group estimated that in 2006 alone, VoIP services saw an
increase of thirty-four million subscribers worldwide. 2 7 As director of the FBI,
Louis J. Freeh stated, currently "[t]he nation's telecommunications networks are
routinely used in the commission of serious criminal activities, including
terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, violent crime, espionage, fraud, and
other white collar crime."' 28  As residential, business, and government use of
VoIP grows and becomes more common, so will the need for law enforcement
wiretaps of those communications.
29
IP telephony utilizes a packet switching network 30 and comes in several
different varieties. 3 1  Packet switching breaks up the call information into
packets which are sent over the network. 32 These packets can be different sizes,
composed of different numbers of bits, and contain varying amounts of
navigational information. 33  The navigational information is used by network
nodes to route the packet to the proper destination. 34  Unlike circuit switch
networks, packet switching does not require the circuit between the source and
destination to be established before the beginning of communication. 35  The
navigational information in the header determines where the packet is going and
24. See generally Vonage Company Profile, Third Quarter 2007, Vonage,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/VAGE/I 89723027x0x56424/ad5OfaO2-58fb-4dc5-abfc-
5bd II00ce9be/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
25. Id.
26. Skype Hits 100M Subscriber Mark, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-6066399-7.html
(Apr. 28, 2006, 23:05 PDT)[hereinafter Skype Hits 100M].
27. Jan Harris, VoIP Attracts 34 Million New Subscribers, VOIP NEWS, July 9, 2007,
http://www.voip-news.co.uk/2007/07/09/voip-attracts-34-million-new-subscribers/.
28. Declaration of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh at 2-3, Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, 14 F.C.C.R. 16794, C.C. Docket No. 97-213 (Third Report and Order)(1999),
available at http://www.askcalea.net/lef/docs/990127-f.pdf [hereinafter Freeh].
29. Id.
30. See GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 3, at 92-93.
31. See generally Patrick Barnard, Internet Engineers Reveal Difficulties in Applying CALEA to
VoIP, TECHNOLOGY MARKETING COMPANY NET.COM, June 21, 2006,
http://ipcommunications.tmcnet.com/hot-topics/ims/articles/ 1617-intemet-engineers-reveal-
difficulties-applying-calea-voip.htm (explaining that the installation of any wiretapping features
will be difficult given the different system architectures offered by VoIP service providers).
32. IBE, supra note 14, at 2.
33. GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 93.
34. Id.
35. IBE, supra note 14, at 2.
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in what order it should be reconstructed. 36 The packet switch network can be
either connectionless or connection-oriented. 37  Packets in a connectionless
environment may all take different routes from source to destination. 38  A
connection-oriented packet switch network acts similar to the circuit switch
architecture. 39  Because of this difference between connectionless and
connection-oriented packet switching, CALEA cannot operate in the same way
on all VoIP services as it does on the PSTN. 40  CALEA wiretaps work by
requiring that telecommunication providers ensure their switches and other
equipment have features and services that aid law enforcement in wiretapping.
4
'
This type of wiretapping presumes and requires that information be sent over a
specific switch.42 Because the Internet does not have to send all packets from a
VoIP communication over one switch, the standard wiretap may be ineffective at
obtaining the information desired.
43
In addition to the differences between packet switch and circuit switch
communications; VoIP comes in several different types. 44 For the purposes of
this comment, the four types of VoIP communication discussed will involve the
relation of the communication to the PSTN, which will allow further discussion
of wiretapping capabilities. The first type of IP telephony service is computer-
to-computer. 45  In the computer-to-computer service, both the source andS• 46
destination users use the same VoIP service application. Computer-to-
computer communications do not employ the PSTN. 47  The second type of
36. See GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 93.
37. Id. at 95.
38. See id. at 96.
39. Id. at 97 ("In a connection-oriented packet-switched network, only one call request packet
contains the source and destination address .... The call request packet establishes the virtual
circuit.").
40. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
41. See Metzger, supra note 23.
42. See WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 220-21 (MIT Press 2007) (1998).
43. See id.; see also Metzger, supra note 23.
44. Barnard, supra note 3 1.
45. Types of VoIP Configurations You Might See, VoIP FAQ,
http://www.voipfaq.net/types+of+voip.php, [hereinafter VoipFAQ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2008); see
also Robert Valdes, How VolP Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/ip-telephony.htm (last visited Apr.6, 2008).
46. See OFCOM, REGULATION OF VoIP SERVICES: ACCESS TO THE EMERGENCY SERVICES
7(2007), http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/voip/voip.pdf [hereinafter OFCOM];OFCOM
is "the independent regulator of television, radio, telecommunications and wireless
communications services in the [United Kingdom]." Id. at 1.
47. See id. at 7.
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service is computer-to-phone. 48  Computer-to-phone communications transfer
the call from the originating computer to a PSTN exchange and then route it as a
normal telephone call. 49  The third type of service is phone-to-computer.
50
Phone-to-computer communications use the same style of contact as computer to
phone, but in reverse. 51  The computer user receives calls from a telephone
network exchange which is transferred to the VoIP service provider from the
PSTN exchange. 52  The fourth and final type of communication involves IP
phones. 53 These telephones are specialized, connecting directly to a router,
54
but are capable of being assigned an ordinary geographic telephone number or a
VoIP number. 55  IP phones have the capability of both the computer-to-
computer and computer-to-phone communications.
6
Different types of VoIP communication mean different problems with
wiretapping. 57 When an interception is attempted against an IP communication
at a fixed location with a fixed number (or Internet address) connecting directly
to a large Internet Service Provider (ISP) or connecting to the PSTN, the wiretap
works much the same way as a tap against the telephone line. Wiretaps
against IP phones and desktop computer based VoIP services have at least the
potential to work in the same method as those on the regular telephone
network. 59  However, VoIP communications do not require fixed locations.
60
These calls simply require an Internet connection. 6 1 Internet connections do not
always lead to fixed IP addresses. 6 2  In fact, if the service on the laptop or
48. VoipFAQ, supra note 45.
49. Id.; see also OFCOM, supra note 46, at 7.
50. OFCOM, supra note 46, at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also VoipFAQ, supra note 45 (noting that computer-to-phone service also works in
much the same manner as computer-to-computer).
53. Valdes, supra note 45.
54. Id.
55. OFCOM, supra note 46, at 7-8.
56. VoipFAQ, supra note 45.
57. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
58. Id.; see also OFCOM, supra note 46, at 8.
59. See BELLOVIN ET AL, supra note 9, at 2.
60. OFCOM, supra note 46, at 8.
61. Id. ("Also, a VoIP service can be for use on the move using wireless broadband (WiMAX
or Wi-Fi). VoIP can, therefore, be a mobile service, sometimes known as Voice over Wireless
(VoWLAN).").
62. More About Networking: What are Static IP, Dynamic IP, and Network Address
Translation (NAT)?, USROBOTICS, http://www.usr.com/education/net9.asp [hereinafter
USROBOTICS]
([N]ot every machine on the Internet can have a static IP address. In the current IP protocol, there
are a limited number of numbered IP addresses, and they need to be conserved. Chances are
2008]
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desktop computer is connected to the ISP through a router or firewall, a different
IP address may be assigned each time the computer requests a new IP address.
63
Similarly, laptops and VolP capable mobile devices can connect to the Internet
through wireless access points around the world. 64 Each time they connect to a
different access point, the IP address usually changes.
65
Aside from IP address difficulties, the larger problem is that of computer-
to-computer, or peer-to-peer, connections. 66 Peer-to-peer VoIP communications
have been thought to be secure from tracking. 67 If the IP address is known,
however, a watermark may be embedded into the communication traffic and can
be traced to the destination IP address; meanin g that encrypted and anonymous
peer-to-peer communications can be tracked. Certain peer-to-peer service
providers encrypt their communications to allow a modicum of privacy for their69
users. There are, however, multiple ways to track anonymous and encrypted
VoIP traffic. One example of tracking occurred recently when a criminal was
traced to Sri Lanka after placing a one minute VoIP call. Though tracking an
anonymous and encrypted peer-to-peer communication can be useful in locating
criminals, it does not meet the standard of wiretapping envisioned by CALEA.
Under those requirements, the interception of calls must include call-identifying
information and call content. 73  The call content requirement is a particular
(unless you request it or you purchase more costly "Business" high-speed internet access) you use
a Dynamic IP address.) (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
63. BELLOVIN ET AL, supra note 4, at 16.; see also USROBOTICS, supra note 55; see also
GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 3, at 275 ("In dynamic [Network Address Translation], a private IP
address is mapped to a public IP address drawn from a pool of registered public IP addresses. By
keeping the internal configuration of the private network hidden, dynamic [Network Address
Translation] helps conceal the network from outside users.").
64. See OFCOM, supra note 46, at 8.
65. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 16.
66. See id. at 3, 13-14.
67. See Xinyuan Wang et al., Tracking Anonymous Peer-to-Peer VoIP Calls on the Internet,
(Alexandria, VA, Nov. 7-11,2005) (Proceedings of 12th ACM Conference on Computer




69. Id. at 2.
70. See id.
71. Eric Bangeman, Fugitive Exec Nabbed After Skype Call, ARS TECI-NICA, Aug. 24, 2006,
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060824-7582.html ("Alexander was traced to the Sri
Lankan capital of Colombo after he placed a one-minute call using Skype.").
72. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(1-2).
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problem for law enforcement wiretaps on VolP communications and is the focus
of this paper.
III. BACKGROUND OF ENCRYPTION AND ITS APPLICATION TO VOIP
A. The Basics of Encryption
Given infinite time and resources, all encryption ciphers can be broken.
Encryption is the process of disguising the substance of a message so that it
cannot be read by an undesired party.7 4 Decry,tion is the process of turning that
disguised message back into a readable form. The process of encryption and
decryption requires four basic elements. 76 The first of these elements is the
message to be encrypted, which is normally referred to as the plaintext. 77 The
second is a secret key which both parties know. 78 The third and fourth elements
are an encryption algorithm and a decryption function, respectively.7 9 Using the
encryption algorithm on the plaintext creates what is known as ciphertext. If
the encryption is done properly, the ciphertext will be readable only after it has
been decoded, which requires the use of the key. 81
Encryption and decryption require the exchange of secret information, the
key, before messages can be encoded and decoded. Keys are generated from a
mathematical algorithm which is designed to produce a new, unique key each
time the algorithm is used. 83  One of the most important principles in
cryptography is that of Kerckhoff.84 First published in 1883, Auguste Kerckhoff
indicated that a system must not require secrecy, 85 and the security of the system
74. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE
IN C 1 (Phil Sutherland ed., 2d ed. John Wiley & Sons 1996).
75. Id.
76. See NIELS FERGUSON & BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 22 (Carol A. Long




80. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 1.
81. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 22.
82. Historical, Frequently Asked Questions, Chapter 1 Introduction, 1.2 What is
Cryptography?, RSA Laboratories, http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2157 (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008).
83. See SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 4.
84. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 23.
85. Auguste Kerckhoff, La Cryptographie Militaire, IX JOURNAL DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES 5
(1883) (translation by Fabien Petitcolas, available at http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/kerckhoffs/
(last visited Apr. 6, 2008)).
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should be based solely on the security of the key. 86 Encryption algorithms that
require keeing secret the way the algorithm works are called restricted
algorithms. These systems are inadequate under current standards because
groups constantly change members. 88 Each time a member leaves the group, the
remaining members must change their algorithm which requires development
time and is expensive for the users. Because of the time and cost constraints of
constantly changing the algorithm, keys were developed which could easily be
changed without affecting the algorithm. 90 The result was an inexpensive and
effective way to maintain message encryption in an ever-changing
environment.9 1  Even if an eavesdropper knows the algorithm used to encrypt
and decrypt the message, if the key is secret, the message remains unreadable.
The key for encryption and decryption functions much the same way as a key in
a lock. 93  An encryption key or decryption key either locks or unlocks the
message so that it may be read or disguised. 
94
There are two types of key based encryption/decryption algorithms. 95 TheS96 . • 97
first is secret-key cryptography, also called a symmetric algorithm. These
systems use an encryption key that can be used to calculate the decryption ke
and vice versa. 9 8 Often, the same key is used for encryption and decryption.
Therefore, symmetric algorithms inseparably link the two functions,' 00 and have
historically been the standard in cryptography. 101 In these systems, the secrecy
86. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 23.
87. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 3.
88. Id. (An example of this would include any group of individuals who decide that they wish
to restrict access to their communications. When a member of the group leaves, in order to
maintain security, the other members must change their restricted algorithms. This can cost the
group valuable time, resources, and funds to create a new restricted algorithm. If this group
happens to be a service provider, the cost is likely passed on to the end users.).
89. See id.; see also DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 13.
90. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 3.
91. Id.; see also DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 13.
92. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 3.
93. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 13.
94. Id.
95. Historical, Frequently Asked Questions, Chapter 1 Introduction, 1.3, What are Some of the
More Popular Techniques in Cryptography?, RSA Laboratories,
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2158, [hereinafter RSA FAQ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
96. Id.
97. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 4.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 38.
101. See IAN CURRY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES 3 (2001),
available at http://www.entrust.com/resources/pdf/cryptointro.pdf.
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of the key is paramount because of its dual role.l°2 Today, probably the most
popular and widely used secret key system is the Data Encryption Standard
(DES). 1
03
In the past twenty years, the second form of encryption/decryption
algorithm, called an asymmetric algorithm or public-key system, has dominated
the course of cryptography.10 4 This key system differs fundamentally from the
symmetric algorithm. 10 5  The asymmetric algorithm uses a public key and a106
private key to encrypt and decrypt messages. In public kev systems, the
private key can be used to either encrypt or decrypt a message. If the private
.... 108
key is used to decrypt the message, the public key is used to encrypt it. If the
private key is used to encrypt the message, the public key will necessarily be
used to decrypt it. 109 Despite the inverse nature of the keys in a public key
system, it is computationally infeasible to discover one key given access to the
other. 110 Though a public key system makes the issue of key secrecy simpler, it
has two drawbacks. II The first is that public key systems are less efficient than
symmetric key systems, by several orders of magnitude. 112 The second problem
is that public key systems require some verification process to ensure the public
key is used by the proper person. 113 Often, practical systems use a combination
of symmetrical and public key encryption methods to secure communications.
1 14
Perhaps the most common version of public key encryption is Rivest, Shamir,
and Adleman (RSA). 115
Three of the most common encryption types are DES, RSA, and the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 16 AES is the new U.S. government
102. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 4.
103. RSA FAQ, supra note 82.
104. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 38.
105. See FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 26.
106. See RSA FAQ, supra note 82.




111. See FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 28; DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 36, at 39.
112. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 28.
113. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 39; see also FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at
29 (stating the job of the key management facility, or certification authority, who receives public
keys from a subscriber and then attaches a digital signature that verifies that the certification
authority identified the specific party as the owner of that public key).
114. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 28.
115. RSA FAQ, supra note 82.
116. See id; VOIPREVIEW.ORG, VOIP SECURITY, http://voipreview.org/news.details.aspx?nid=7
(last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
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encryption standard.11 7 AES and DES have different structures. 118 DES can
only be scaled to a 128-bit encryption by using three DES encryptions in
sequence." 9  AES can easily be scaled up to 256-bit encryption, which is far
beyond the current standard, and makes the time required to break the cipher
exponentially longer. 120 RSA can be scaled up to 2048-bits for extremely
121valuable keys. Though the above represent several common ciphers, there are
myriad other encryption methods of varying degrees of strength and
effectiveness. 1
2 2
B. Encryption Options for VoIP
Currently, there are several ways in which VoIP communications may be
encrypted. 123 Because these communications are broken into data packets, it is
feasible to use common encryption methods already in use for online
communications in text format. 124 For instance, Skype, a popular VoIP provider
that functions by peer-to-peer connections, employs AES encryption which is
used by U.S. government organizations to protect sensitive information.
125
Though AES can use as low as 128-bit encryption, Skype boasts a 256-bit
encryption, which provides the possibility of 2256 unique keys. 126  Vonage,
another popular version of IP phone, uses Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
instead of peer-to-peer technology. 127  Though Vonage does not currently
employ encryption, 12 8 SIP phones have standardized security and encryption
117. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 55.
118. See id. at 55-56.
119. Id. at 51.
120. See id; see also SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 9.
121. See Frequently Asked Questions, Chapter 3 Techniques in Cryptography, 3.1.5 How Large
a Key Should be Used in the RSA Cryptosystem?, RSA Laboratories,
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2218 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
122. See FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 51-62.
123. See How to: Encrypt Your VolP, VoIPNow.com,
http://www.voipnow.org/2007/04/how to-encrypt_.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
124. Id.
125. TOM BERSON, SKYPE SECURITY EVALUATION 1-3 (Skype 2005), available at
http://www.skype.com/security/files/2005-031 %o20security%/o20evaluation.pdf [hereinafter
BERSON]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
LABORATORY, ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD FEDERAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING STANDARDS 1 (2001), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-
197.pdf [hereinafter FIPS].
126. FIPS, supra note 125, at 1; BERSON, supra 124, at 3.
127. Tracy V. Wilson, Skype v. Vonage, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/skype-vonage3.htm (last visited Apr.6, 2008).
128. Id.
[Vol. 15:2
BIG BROTHER HEARS YOU
capabilities. 129  This VoIP type can employ various types of encryption to
protect the content of calls.13 These communications can take advantage of a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) client, which creates a secure channel between
the source and destination of a call. 131 If VPN clients and Internet Protocol
Security (IPsec) 132 do not afford the desired quality of service for a
communication, the user can employ Secured Socket Layer (SSL) 133 technology,
which is usually used to encrypt credit card purchases over the Internet. 134 VoP
can also use the strong encryption of a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
(SRTP), 13  which is already employed by a number of VoIP providers. 136
Technologically savvy individual users can also employ AES, DES, or RSA
encryptions using either a self-constructed communication program or one
already in place. Because of the differences between these security protocols,
a government organization seeking to break the encryption would first have to
discover which type it is, and then plan an attack suited for that protocol. 1
38
129. See Cisco, Overview of SIP Security 1-4 (Cisco 2008), available at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/l2_3/vvf_c/ciscoios-sip-security-applicationguide/sipsec
ov.pdf.(last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
130. See id.; see also ALAN B. JOHNSTON, SIP: UNDERSTANDING THE SESSION INITIATION
PROTOCOL 59-60 (2d ed. Artech House, Inc. 2004).
131. See Anthony Plewes, The Dos and Don 'ts of VoIP Security, SILICON.cOM, Apr. 4, 2007,
http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/voipsecurity/0,3800013656,39166658,00.htm; see
also D. RICHARD KUHN ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR VOICE OVER IP SYSTEMS 65-66 (U.S. Dept of Commerce 2005), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf
132. Internet Protocol Security is a framework of protocols used to secure communications on
the network or packet processing layer. SearchSecurity.com Definitions,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci214037,00.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2008).
133. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): How It Works, Verisign.com,
http://www.verisign.com/ssl/ssl-information-center/how-ssl-security-works/ (explaining that
Secure Socket Layer technology uses asymmetric or public key encryption to create "a secure
session that guarantees message privacy and message integrity.")(last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
134. Plewes, supra note 131.
135. What is SRTP?, Whatis.com,
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci1233810,00.html (indicating that Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol technology uses encryption and authentication to minimize the potential
for certain attacks on a communication.)(last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
136. Plewes, supra note 131.
137. See KUHN ET AL., supra note 131, at 70.
138. See generally FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 55-58 (explaining that because of
the complex structures of each protocol, the chances of an attack are low.)
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IV. HISTORY OF WIRETAPPING
A. A Brief History of Wiretapping in the United States
To understand the impact of CALEA on wiretapping, it is necessary to
cover the history of wiretapping in the United States. Although some believe
wiretapping is an evil attempt to limit individual privacy, 139 it is more accurately
an investigative tool with a secretive nature that invokes suspicion and a
potential for abuse. 140 Wiretapping did not start with the telephone. 14 1 Civil
War generals used telegraph wiretappers, 142 as did stockbrokers in the 1860s. 1
4 3
In the early 1890s, New York City police were the first to tap telephone lines for
investigations.' 44  Early wiretaps consisted of connections made to the wires
running to telephone or telegraph poles, but evolved into the transmission of the
tapped signal via an alternate line to a convenient and secure location for
recording and monitoring. 
14 5
Before 1968, an agent assigned to tap a phone line only needed the help of
the telephone company in determining the cable and pair numbers to make a tap
on a particular line against a specific person. 14 6 The cooperation of telephone
companies in court-ordered wiretaps was optional 147 until 1970, when the law
was amended to provide that when requested, an order could contain directions
to a carrier or other persons to provide assistance and information in the
148execution of the wiretap. It was not until 1994 that legislation was created to
require wiretapping capabilities to be built into the telephone system. 14 9  As
wiretapping has become more sophisticated, its use has also increased. 150 This
139. See Threats to Privacy, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 11, 2004,
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-82586#_Toc458240161.
140. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 175.
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 23 (Da Capo Press 1971) (1959).
144. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 175 (citing DASH ET AL., supra note 142, at 35).
145. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5.
146. EDITH J. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 124 (Hayden Book Co. 1974) (explaining that
"[l]aw enforcement agents need[ed] to know the cable and pair numbers in order to effectuate a tap
on a particular telephone line - the cable in which the suspect's telephone line is located and the
particularpair in the cable.").
147. Id. at 123.
148. Id.
149. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act § 102, 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1-3)
(2006)
150. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 WIRETAP REPORT 39 tbl. 9 (2006), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap06/Table92006.pdf [hereinafter WIRETAP REPORT].
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growth can be seen from J. Edgar Hoover's denial of its usefulness until 1957,151
to a total of 1839 intercept orders issued by judges over the course of the 2006
calendar year. 152
B. Wiretap Legislation in the United States Before and up to CALEA
Under CALEA and earlier statutes, a wiretap must be performed in a way
that minimizes interception of conversations that are not authorized by a
warrant. 153 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 created
the first com rehensive framework for electronic surveillance in criminal
investigations. 154 That framework allowed limited interception of oral and wire
communications to be performed "(i) only when other investigative techniques
have failed, reasonably appear unlikely to succeed, or are too dangerous to
attempt, (ii) only for the investigation of serious, statutorily-specified felony
offenses, and (iii) only for the interception of criminal communications."' 155
CALEA built upon the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act not by
repeating the elements of the statute, but by requiring telecommunications
providers to implement wiretap capabilities in their systems. 156 The substantive
provisions of the later Act originally applied only to telecommunications
carriers, which included little more than telephone companies. 157 This changed
in June of 2006 with a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. 158 In American Council on Education v. FCC, the
court ruled in a two-to-one decision that VoIP providers counted as
telecommunications carriers and were subject to the wiretap capability
provisions. 159
CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to meet assistance capability
requirements.1 6  Instead of design specifications, it compels carriers to ensure
151. LAPIDUS, supra note 146, at 67 ("Until 1957 [Hoover] denied that organized crime existed
and denounced wiretapping as a lazy man's tool and an obstacle" to the creation of sound
investigative techniques.).
152. WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 150, at 15 tbl. 2.
153. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING §8:34, at
8-59 (2d ed. West 2004) (1978); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(4) (requiring telecommunications
carriers to be capable of "facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-
identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's
telecommunications service and in a manner that protects -(A) the privacy and security of
communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be intercepted.").
154. Freeh, supra note 28, at 3.
155. Id.
156. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a).
157. See 47 U.S.C. § 153; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002.
158. Am. Council on Educ. v. F.C.C., 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
159. Id. at 235-36.
160. Id. at 236.
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that their equipment and facilities are capable of expeditiously isolating and
enabling law enforcement "to access call-identifying information" and deliver
"intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization." 161 The
call-identifying information required is the "dialing or signaling information that
identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any
equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier." 162 In addition
to call-identifying information, telecommunications providers are required to
deliver call content. 163
These requirements were to be built into or added onto the existing PSTN
framework. 164  This addition to the architecture was performed with median
difficulty by using functions like the conference calling features of the switches
and adapting them to allow conference calls with silent listeners. 165 With this
change in wiretap implementation, CALEA effectively allowed law enforcement166Ths
to obtain additional information not available to taps on the local loop. These
wiretaps garner more information for law enforcement officers by allowing them
167to view information previously unavailable to them using wireline taps.
Under CALEA -the information available to the switch--call forwarding
information, speed dial lists, [and] true caller identities.. ." are all available to
the wiretap. 168 Though compliant wiretaps obtain more information and require
less work by telecommunication companies, they cost law enforcement ten times
more than traditional taps. 169  Despite the costs, compliant wiretaps are
161. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)-(3).
162. Id. § 1001(2).
163. Id. § 1002(a)(3).
164. See U.S. CALEA MARKET INSIGHT 2 (2003).
http://www.corp.att.com/stateandlocal/docsUS CALEAMarketInsight.pdf.
165. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-6 ("By requiring that digitally-switched networks be
built in accordance with federal specifications for wiretapping, CALEA changed the design
process.").
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT: AUDIT REPORT 06-13 at xiii (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a06l3/final.pdf, [hereinafter OIG AUDIT] ("A
traditional wiretap costs law enforcement about $250. However. . . a wiretap with CALEA
features costs law enforcement approximately $2,200, according to law enforcement officials and
carrier representatives .... ").
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substantially more efficient than previous methods. 17  Implementation of
CALEA on the PSTN is essentially straightforward because it requires that all
central office switches conform to a single standard. 17 1  This method of
requiring conformity will not work for VoIP systems as they currently stand. 172
C. Wiretap Legislation in the United Kingdom and Wiretap Examples
from Europe
Though the United States limits its use of wiretaps to serious crimes,173
other nations do not share the same standards. 174 There are substantially more
wiretaps performed in Europe than in the United States with less oversight and
fewer privacy protections. The European Union Police Cooperation Working
Group considered tagging each user of a satellite communications network
because of the possibility of necessary surveillance issues. 176  British
wiretapping is not a function of the judiciary at all, because the home secretary, a
Cabinet minister, approves all wiretaps without a judge's opinion. 177 In 2001,
English cabinet ministers authorized over 3400 wiretaps. 178  This figure
excludes wiretaps in Northern Ireland, which have never been reported by the
Interception of Communications Commissioner Report. 179 France surpasses
England with over 4600 wiretaps authorized by8the Commission Nationale De
L'Informatique et des Libertes (CNIL) in 2002. Requests for identification of
cellular phone numbers were estimated in the same year at an average of 8000 to
25,000 requests per month. 181 Italian wiretaps have doubled every two years
170. Id. at 42 ("[A] New York law enforcement official noted that his agency can now initiate a
wiretap on a wireless phone within a day. He also said that the carriers have greater capacity to
conduct more wiretaps simultaneously.").
171. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
172. See id.
173. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 225.
174. Id.
175. Eric Weiner, Wiretapping, European-Style. Think Bush's NSA Surveillance is Bad??? ..
TECHREPUBLIC.COM, Feb. 14, 2006, http://techrepublic.com.com/5208-6230-
0.html?forumlD=8&threadlD = 190272.
176. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 225.
177. Weiner, supra note 175.
178. See Surveillance of Communications Goes Through the Roof, STATEWATCH.ORG,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jan/1 1 ukteltap.htm.
179. Id.
180. French Republic, Privacy International,
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since 2001, and in 2003 had a total of 77,000 requested wiretaps. 182 This boils
down to 172 judicial intercepts in Italy in 2003 per 100,000 people in the
country. 183 The United States authorized just over 1400 wiretaps in 2003,184 but
only denies an average of one or two wiretap requests per year.185
The European approach to wiretapping communications varies from
country to country. 186 The United Kingdom takes an approach that is not
followed by any other country in the world. 187 England's telecommunications
surveillance statute is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 188
The purpose of that statute is to allow the Security and Intelligence Services to
conduct intelligence gathering for a number of uses, including disrupting
• 189
operations. RIPA gives the Security and Intelligence Services loosely defined
terms and indicates that "authorised surveillance [is] lawful for all purposes."' 190
For a law enforcement agency to obtain surveillance authorization, under the
British statute, the request must be necessary on specified grounds and the
surveillance must be proportionate to the goal to be achieved. 191 The statute
requires that the authorizing official consider whether the information sought
may be reasonably obtained by means other than intrusive surveillance.
192
Unlike United States surveillance authorizations, RIPA lists a series of officers
with authority to authorize surveillance. 193 Not one of these authorized parties is
a judge or judicial officer. 194
This standard for obtaining a wiretap is lower than the narrowly focused
requirements on United States law enforcement under CALEA, but there is yet
another distinctive difference between United Kingdom and United States
182. Italian GSM Provider Warns: Too Many Wiretaps, EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS, Feb. 24,
2005, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.4/wiretap.
183. Id.
184. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 WIRETAP REPORT 15 tbl 2 (2003) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap03/Table2-03.pdf.
185. See The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, July 2006, http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap-overview.html.
186. See Keir Starmer, Setting the Record Straight: Human Rights in an Era of International
Terrorism, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 123, 129 (2007) (discussing surveillance systems in the
United Kingdom).
187. Id.
188. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, § 1 (United Kingdom).
189. Starmer, supra note 186, at 129.
190. Amanda Hale & John Edwards, Getting It Taped, 12(3) COMP. & TELECOMM. L. REv. 71,
72 (2006) (discussing the impact of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act in the United
Kingdom).
191. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § 32(2)(b).
192. Id. § 32(4).
193. Id. § 32(6)(a)-(n).
194. See id.
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wiretaps. 195 Under RIPA sections 17 and 18, surveillance and wiretap evidence
collected by law enforcement and the Security and Intelligence Services is not
admissible in criminal prosecution. 196  Sections 17(1) and 17(l)(a) state "no
evidence shall be adduced, question asked, assertion or disclosure made or other
thing done in, for the purposes of or in connection with any legal
proceedings... which.., discloses.., any of the contents of an intercepted
communication or any related communications data."' 197 Under this statute, the
government can intercept data and compel a user to disclose the keys to unlock
any encryption embedded within the intercepted data. 198
Instead of taking steps to ensure that law enforcement can break encryption,
or placing wiretaps in places that circumvent encryption, England has created a
novel approach to wiretapping VoIP and other communications.1 99  Part III
section 49 of RIPA requires that if protected information (encrypted
communications) comes into the hands of law enforcement, individuals or
companies with encryption/decryption keys are required to surrender the keys to
the communication or face jail time. 20 If law enforcement or a hacker has
encryption/decryption keys, the encrypted communication is open for
eavesdropping.
The section containing the key disclosure requirement is broad. 202 Part III
section 49 applies to protected information that:
(a) has come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise
of statutory power to seize, detain, inspect, search or otherwise to
interfere with documents or other property, or is likely to do so; (b) has
come into the possession of any person by means of the exercise of any
statutory power to intercept communications, or is likely to do so;...
[or] (e) has, by any other lawful means not involving the exercise of
195. Compare Starmer, supra note 186, at 129 with U.S. CONST. amend. IV and 47 U.S.C. §
1002 (a)(4)(2006).
196. Id.; see also Hale, supra note 190, at 73; see also Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
§§ 17-18.
197. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act §§ 17(1)-(a).
198. See Law Requiring Disclosure of Encryption Keys in Force, OUT-LAW.COM, Oct. 2, 2007,
http://www.out-law.com/default.aspx?page=8515.
199. See UK ST 2000 c. 23 Pt. III § 49 (Section forty-nine makes neither mention of breaking
encryptions, nor placing wiretaps at specific locations. The section's importance revolves around
the unique answer to encryption by requiring divulgence of encryption keys upon request by law
enforcement.).
200. OUT-LAW.COM, supra note 198.
201. Nancy Gohring, Zfone Encrypts VoIP for Windows Users but Doesn't Work with Skype, PC
ADVISOR, May 22, 2006, http://www.pcadvisor.co.uk/news/index.cfm?newsid=6219.
202. Ken Fisher, UK Can Now Demand Data Decryption on Penalty of Jail Time, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 1, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071001-uk-can-now-demand-
data-decryption-on-penalty-of-jail-time.html.
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statutory powers, come into the possession of any of the intelligence
services, the police.., or is likely so to come into the possession of any
of those services .... 203
Law enforcement agents or agencies may impose a disclosure requirement
to obtain the key, after possessing the information or if they are likely to
intercept it.2 04  The disclosure requirement is justified for national security205 , .206 ,.
purposes, crime prevention or detection, or in the interests of the
economic well-being of the United Kingdom."' 207  These requirements
essentially make it criminal to refuse to decrypt or hand over decryption keys for
almost any encrypted data requested under the auspices of a terror or criminal
investigation. 208
The statute was intended to aid law enforcement in catching terrorists,
pedophiles, and computer criminals. 209  However, the key possession
requirement and disclosure request may simply force a criminal to choose
whether to be charged for his alleged crime or charged for non-compliance with
the request. 2 1  Once the disclosure request has been made, non-compliance can
result in either a two or five year prison sentence, 2 1 1 even if the person is no
longer in possession of the required keys. 2 12  Section 53(2) indicates that a
person is in possession of a key:
if it is shown that that person was in possession of a key to any protected
information at any time before the time of the giving of the section 49
notice, that person shall be taken for the purposes of those proceedings
to have continued to be in possession of that key at all subsequent times,
unless it is shown that the key was not in his possession after the giving
of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose
it.
2 13
Even though a person may be convicted of possessing and not disclosing a
key when he does not have it, this section could be a blessing in disguise forS•.214
certain criminals. If a criminal has encrypted data, such as child pornography,
203. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, §§ 49(1)(a)-(e) (United Kingdom).
204. Id. § 49(2)(d).
205. Id. § 49(3)(a).
206. Id. § 49(3)(b).
207. Id. § 49(3)(c).
208. Fisher, supra note 202.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § 53(5)(a).
212. See id. § 53(2).
213. Id.
214. See Fisher, supra note 202.
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he may have an easier time serving a sentence of two years for non-compliance• - 215
than serving a longer sentence for a child pornography conviction. Another
hole in the legislation appears in the notice and non-compliance sections.
2 16
Recently, British law enforcement "invited" an animal rights activist to hand
over a decryption key for encrypted data found on her confiscated hard drive.
2 17
It is unclear if the "invitation" is an official notice under section 49 of RIPA.
2 18
The potential for ineffectual notice and the evasion of punishment for a crime, by
refusing to decrypt information, indicate there are flaws in the new legislation
that will have unknown effects.
2 19
D. Fourth Amendment and Privacy in Wiretapping
CALEA will either become an important first step to ensuring law
enforcement agencies have tools to combat crime and promote security, or the
efforts will extend too far, casting an unwelcome gaze onto the private
communications of innocent citizens. 2 ° Wiretapping has become an important
part of law enforcement capabilities since its first use in the early 1890s, but
must be balanced against the Fourth Amendment "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures .... " 22 2  Regardless of the benefits of RIPA, or the
standards for wiretaps used in the European Union, United States citizens are
entitled to privacy against unreasonable searches and seizures unless a warrant is
issued "upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
' 223
Though there may be a temptation to implement CALEA capabilities at a
residential gateway, 24  and potentially subject massive numbers of
communications to wiretap interceptions, it is important to maintain privacy
215. Id.
216. See John Leyden, Animal Rights Activist Hit with RIPA Key Decrypt Demand, THE
REGISTER, Nov. 14, 2007 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/14/ripa-encryption-key-.notice/.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id.; see also Fisher, supra note 202.
220. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, FIRST REPORT AND ORDER AND FURTHER NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING, FCC 05-153, 55 (2005) (statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-153A1.pdf [hereinafter
FCC REPORT].
221. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 177.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
223. Id.
224. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 221-22.
225. Id.
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standards and the narrow and tailored nature of wiretaps currently in force.
226
The tailoring of wiretap applications includes a written statement including an
• .,. .. 227
oath or affirmation to the judge of competent jurisdiction. The application
must also contain:
a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by
the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i)
details as to the particular offense ... (ii) ... a particular description of the
nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the
communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of
communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if
known, committing the offense ... 228
Though wiretap applications and implementation must be narrow and
specified, and despite the privacy and oversight structures in place, "[w]hen a
government has the power to invade privacy, abuses occur."
' 229
The temptation to infringe on liberties in order to maintain national security
was observed by Niccolo Machiavelli. 23  Machiavelli stated "when the well-
being of one country is at all in question, no consideration of justice or injustice,
of mercy or cruelty, of honour or shame must be allowed to enter." 231 Although
compelling, Machiavelli's interest in national security would extend not only to
outside invaders but to potential threats within a nation. 232 This view would
override the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is "to protect the people
of the United States against arbitrary action[s] by their own Government ....
,,233
Under the Fourth Amendment and applicable statutes, U.S. courts waveredS 234
in their support of wiretaps. In Olmstead v. United States, circa 1928, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of warrantless wiretaps in criminal cases. 235 The
five justices of the majority indicated that the Fourth Amendment protected only
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
227. Id. § 2518(1).
228. Id. § 2518(1)(b).
229. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 169.
230. STERLING JOHNSON, GLOBAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE: THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST V.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1994).
231. Id.
232. See NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND OTHER WRITINGS, 196-97 (Wayne A. Rebhom
trans., Barnes & Noble Books 2003) (Machiavelli's notion that the well-being of a country is
above considerations of morality, cruelty, and injustice for enemies of national security readily
applies to citizens of the country when he writes, ". . .there must be a memorable punishment of
those who are the enemies of the present state of affairs.") Id. at 196.
233. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
234. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 177-79,189-94.
235. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
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tangible objects, and that conversations were not protected. 236 Nine years later
in Nardone v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that, under the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 (FCA), 237 wiretaps initiated by federal agents,. 238
were not admissible as evidence in a criminal proceeding. In a second case
involving Nardone, the court decided that evidence derived from warrantless
wiretaps was also inadmissible. 239  Finally, the Supreme Court in Weiss v.
United States, decided that the FCA applied to, and excluded, wiretap evidence
from interstate and intrastate communications. 24  After these decisions,
Attorney General Robert Jackson ordered a cessation of FBI wiretapping. 24 1 In
1940, this prohibition was overridden by President Roosevelt, at the behest of J.
Edgar Hoover, for national security purposes. 242 Even though the prohibition
was lifted for national security reasons, it was not until the Omnibus Safe Streets
and Crime Control Act that Congress made it legal for law enforcement to
wiretap with a warrant.
243
V. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SEEING AND KNOWING
It is possible to track an encrypted communication between two IP
addresses, even if one is unknown. 244 It is impossible, however, to listen to the
content of an encrypted VoIP communication without breaking or undermining
the encryption. 245  Because of the inherent difficulties in wiretapping packet
switched networks, and the need to break encryptions, law enforcement agencies
need a more tailored method for obtaining wiretaps other than the original
wireline or CALEA model. 24 6 However, this tailored method should not take
the form of a back door into encrypted systems.
247
236. Id.
237. The Communication Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission and
gave it regulating authority over radio and wire for interstate and international communications.
47 U.S.C. § 151-52; see also About the FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2008).
238. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937).
239. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939).
240. See Weiss v. United States, 302 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
241. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 179.
242. Id. at 179.
243. Id. at 193-95.
244. See WANG ET AL., supra note 67.
245. Id.
246. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 11-15.
247. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 9.
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A. Why Packet Switching Impedes Wiretap Capabilities
Even if the communication is not encrypted, packet switch networks create
potential difficulties to wiretapping communications. 248 Some types of VoIP
communications work solely on a packet switching network. If the
communication takes a defined static path through a communication network,
the call may be easily intercepted and recorded by placing a tap between two
switches or routers along that path. 25  The fundamental flaw in this system of
wiretapping is that packets do not always travel down the same path in a
network, even if the source and destination addresses do not change. United
States Patent 7,055,174 considers the problem of different packet routes and
answers the problem by placing the wiretapping system at the first network
252
node. This is tantamount to the original wireline method of placing a tap
within the last mile, near the local loop. There is still a problem with this type
of wiretapping: wireless communication towers. 254
At a typical home with a wireless router, wiretapping at the first network
node poses no great risk of exposing law enforcement wiretaps, yet this is
potentially the least likely place for a crime committed over VolP.2 55 Cities like
London and New York have thousands of wireless access points 256 and have
repeatedly been the focus of terrorist attacks. 257  This year, New York City
boasts 6371 wireless access points along the survey route, and London 7130.258
248. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 14-15.
249. GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 92-93.
250. See U.S. Patent No. 7,055,174 para. 1 (filed Feb. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.patentstorm.us/patents/7055174-claims.html, [hereinafter Patent 7,055,174] (last
visited Apr. 7, 2008); see also FreePatentsOnline,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/20060018255.html, [hereinafter Free Patents] (last visited Apr.
7, 2008).
251. GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 96.
252. See Patent 7,055,174, supra note 250, para. 10.
253. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 5.
254. See Metzger, supra note 23.
255. See generally DANILO YANICH, CRIME CREEP: URBAN & SUBURBAN CRIME ON LOCAL TV
NEWS 14 (2004).
256. RSA SECURITY, THE WIRELESS SECURITY SURVEY OF NEW YORK CITY 2 (3d ed. 2007),
available at
http://www.rsa.com/solutions/wireless/survey/wireless-security-survey-nyc_2007.pdf,
[hereinafter SURVEY OF NEW YORK].
257. See Maria Godoy, Timeline: London's Explosive History, NPR.org, July 7, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4734400; see e.g. Meyer Berger, Bomber is
Booked; Sent to Bellevue for Mental Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1957, at 1; Douglas Jehl, A Tool of
Foreign Terror, Little Known in the U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1993, at 24; Robert D. McFadden,
A Grim Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at Al.
258. SURVEY OF NEW YORK, supra note 256, at 2.
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Though only twenty-four percent of the access points in New York are
unsecured, and nineteen percent in London, 259 that still leaves more than 1500
access points available for misuse in New York, and more than 1300 in London.
There are currently groups such as NYC wireless that seek to promote and
further expand the already pervasive free wireless access in major cities.2 6 0
If properly configured, a communication can change wireless access points
in the middle of the communication without any substantial effect on the
.. 261
conversation. This requires law enforcement to track the geographic position
of the mobile VoIP source, tap all of the available wireless access points in the
• . 262
vicinity, or place the wiretap closer to the source of the communication.
Tapping numerous access points or tracking and changing the location of the tap
quickly poses problems with the minimization requirements of CALEA, 23
where law enforcement must ensure minimal eavesdropping on communications
and communications channels not within the scope of the warrant. 264  The
problem of discovery arises from having to place a wiretap closer to the mark.
26 5
With the possibility of constantly changing the access point and packet path
through the network, law enforcement agencies lose the valuable asset of an
attenuated choke point. 266  CALEA sought to use these choke points, nodes
through which all communications must pass, to allow law enforcement to
wiretap in comfort. 26 7 As the choke point for communications comes closer to
the source of the communications, the risk of detection becomes greater. 268
The final underlying problem with the packet switch network and the
elimination of choke points is the right and opportunity of law enforcement to
, ,. 269
access the VolP user's machine. In an effort to exploit these choke points, theFBI used a system called Carnivore to monitor email, file transfers, and web
259. Id. at 3.
260. Tom Vanderbuilt, Walker in the Wireless City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at CY 1.
261. Free Patents, supra note 250. (United States Patent 20,070,047,516).
262. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 298.
263. See Steven Bellovin, Wiretapping the Net, The Bridge, Vol. 30, Num. 2, Summer 2000,
available at http://www.nae.edu/nae/bridgecom.nsf/weblinks/NAEW-4Q6TS8?OpenDocument.
[hereinafter Wiretapping the Net].
264. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002.
265. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 295-99.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 220-21.
268. Id. at 298.
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browsing without warrants. 2 7  The use of the system has fallen by the wayside
after public and political outcry, and after more effective commercial options
surfaced. 27 1 The program moved a step past CALEA and allowed the FBI the
capability of massive simultaneous wiretapping. 272 Carnivore was intended to
gather all information or specific information that passed through a given
Internet Service Provider (ISP). 2 73 The system could be set up to either fully
wiretap or identify specific conversations which would not eavesdrop on the
content of the Internet traffic. 2 74  Carnivore created public outcry due to its
obvious intimidating name, and its ability to read and copy large amounts ofS• 275
communications. The FBI's initial use of CALEA telephone architecture
enabled it to eavesdrop and record over 57,000 communications lines
simultaneously. 276 Though the ability of the FBI's use of Carnivore leads to
impressive numbers, CALEA requires law enforcement to minimize the
communications they intercept to those specifically enumerated in the
warrant. 2 77  The FBI can open its capabilities and swallow large amounts of
communications, but trouble still revolves around staying within the auspices of
the wiretap warrant while tracing packets that take separate routes when both end
points are not known.
278
B. Peer-to-Peer Communications Will Often Evade Detection of Law
Enforcement
Peer-to-peer communications are fundamentally different from other VoIP
communications. 279 VoIP communications all begin with protocols that act as a
270. See STEPHEN P. SMITH ET AL., INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE
SYSTEM, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE viii (2000)
http://www.usdoj .gov/archive/j md/camiv..final.pdf.
271. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 269-7 1.
272. See Id.
273. Id. at 269.
274. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 270, at viii.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(1) reads in
part:
[a] telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or
services... are capable of- (1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the
government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept
to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic
communications carried by the carrier within a service area ....
Id.
278. See generally WANG ET AL., supra note 67, at 1-3; See also Wiretapping the Net, supra note
263.
279. See OFCOM, supra note 46, at 7-8.
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handshake between the two users that begins a conversation. 280  Peer-to-peer
communications differ from other conversations because they have little use for
the ISP or the provider network. 28 After the handshake, these communications
use packet routing determined by the conversing parties or occasionally, by the
provider, such as Skype. 282 Because peer-to-peer connections do not use the
PSTN, their connections cannot be wiretapped by the usual means.283
If an eavesdropper wishes to attack a peer-to-peer communication, he
would naturally place his tap as near as possible to the originating Internet
connection, like the home router or initial junction between the Internet cable
and the rest of the network. 2 84 This method, however, does not benefit law
285
enforcement. The individual routers or initial Internet connections are
unintelligent. 286 The routers cannot tell the difference between one type of
communication and another.2 87  Therefore, law enforcement would have to
require the ISP from each party to the conversation send a signal indicating when
to begin recording to ensure the conversation is being captured rather than
random Internet traffic.
288
Even if the ISP could give timely notice to law enforcement, the ISP would
• . 289
still not catch all the peer-to-peer communications. These communications
are not limited, as some other VoIP styles, to physical phone equipment or
• 290
specific hardware and software requirements. Asterisk is one such peer-to-
peer VoIP communication program. 29 1 Each Asterisk user is involved in the
programming and implementation of his own Asterisk program. 292 The creation
of one of these programs may be as simple or as encrypted and complex as the
user desires. 293 Because these programs do not go through normal channels, and
only require an Internet connection, Asterisk users can maneuver easier in an
280. TED WALLINGFORD, SWITCHING TO VOIP 12 (Michael K. Loukides ed., O'Reilly 2005).
281. Id.
282. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 3-4.
283. Id.
284. Id at 5.
285. Id.
286. DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 296-97.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 298.
290. JIM VAN MEGGELEN ET AL., ASTERISK: THE FUTURE OF TELEPHONY 9 (Michael K. Loukides
ed.,O'Reilly 2005).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 5.
293. Id. at 10.
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environment where peer-to-peer providers may track movements for law
enforcement. 
294
C. Encryption: Why it Could be Impossible to Know What VoIP Conversations
Involve
In order to discover the contents of an Internet communication, an
eavesdropper must capture the conversation in real-time or near real-time
because the data packets for VoIP are not stored like those of an email. 29 5 If a
communication is not encrypted, an eavesdropper can use tools freely available
on the Internet to capture and record calls. 296 One such program is called Voice
Over Misconfigured Internet Telephones (VOMIT). 297  However, if the
communication is encrypted, the difficulties for the eavesdropper rise literally at
an exponential rate. a9 8  If a VoIP communication employs a public key
encryption system, it could take an eavesdropper with access to Cray
29 9
computers an infeasible amount of time to break the secret key used for decoding
the message. 30 A real world example of this took place in 2002 when 331,000
volunteers cracked a sixty-four bit cipher after four years of computing.30 1 A
sixty-four bit cipher key requires 264 possible key values. 30 2 If a cipher key is
128 bit, as is the current standard, it would require somewhere in the realm of
2128 processes to break the algorithm. 30 3 To place the difficulty in perspective,
the possibility of winning the grand prize in a state lottery in the United States
and being killed by a lightning strike in the same day are 1 in 2", and 2170
represents the number of atoms in the planet. 304
294. See Y.J. LIANG, ET AL., MULTI-STREAM VOICE OVER IP USING PACKET PATH DIVERSITY 4,
Appearing in 2001 Fourth Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing) (IEEE 2001), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-bgirod/pdfs/mmsp.pdf.
295. Kim Zetter, Privacy Guru Locks Down VoIP, WIRED, July 26, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2005/07/68306?currentPage= 1.
296. DAVID ENDLER & MARK COLLIER, HACKING EXPOSED VOIP: VOICE OVER IP SECURITY
SECRETS AND SOLUTIONS 160-65 (2007)
297. Id.
298. See SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 31.
299. "The Cray T3E-1 20 0 ETM system [debuting in 1995] was the first supercomputer to sustain
one teraflop (1 trillion calculations per second) on a real world application." Cray History,
http://www.cray.com/about-cray/history.html (last visited Apr.8, 2008).
300. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 31.
301. Denmis Fisher, Team Cracks RSA Encryption Challenge, EWEEK.COM, Sept. 27, 2002,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,560039,00.asp.
302. FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 34.
303. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 9; see also FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 43.
304. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 18.
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The effectiveness of cryptography does not require that a key be
unbreakable. 30 5 The measure of effectiveness for a given cipher is whether it is
computationally secure (i.e. it cannot be broken with current or future estimated
available resources). 30 6 In its simplest form, the security of an algorithm can be
understood as a balance between the time required to break the algorithm and the
time the encrypted data must remain secret.30 7 Crime is often time sensitive.
30 8
The FBI recognizes that terrorist attacks, bombings, kidnappings, and repetitive
violent crimes are among the most time sensitive crimes. 309 Using an encryption
method even as low as the fifty-six bit key encryption in DES could cost the
government up to one million dollars to break the simple encryption in ten
days. 3 1  DES is on the edge of what current technology can break with its fifty-
six bit encryption, however, the standard key length is currently 128-bit. 3 11 It is
not possible to determine the time required to break a 128-bit encryption based
on the ten-day figure for fifty-six bit encryption as the difference in possible
combinations between the two, 256 to 2128, is an exponential difference. With
a possible decryption time of ten days to thirty years, the value of time sensitive
data is likely to be lost.
3 13
D. The Effect of the FCC Deadline for Wiretap Capabilities on the United States
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) required VoIP wiretap
capability enhancements were to be completed by May 2007.314 Though the Act
covered all broadband Internet service providers, it was not immediately forced
on libraries 3 15 or universities. 3 16  Both libraries and universities opposed the
305. See id. at 8.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See FBI, Investigative Programs Critical Incident Response Group,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/isd/cirg/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
309. Id.
310. Michael Anderson, Internet Security - Firewalls & Encryption the Cyber Cop's
Perspective, NEW TECHNOLOGIES INC., http://www.forensics-intl.com/artl .html.(last visited Apr. 8,
2008).
311. Id.
312. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 9.
313. See FERGUSON & SCHNEIER, supra note 76, at 37.
314. Nate Anderson, CALLA Deadline Arrives: US VolP, Broadband Must Be Wiretap-Friendly,
ARS TECHNICA, May 14, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070514-calea-deadline-
arrives-us-voip-broadband-must-be-wiretap-friendly.html.
315. ALBERT GIDARI, OFFICE FOR INFO. TECH. POLICY AND AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, THE
COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT (CALFA) AND LIBRARIES 3 (2007),
available at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/woissues/techinttele/calea/caleajan07.pdf.
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legislation due to the potential for high costs. 3 17 Under the Act, if a university or
library obtains Internet access through a facilities-based provider, the university
or library has no CALEA obligations. 3 18 However, if a library obtains Internet
access via a regional or local network, a private network, or an academic
institution, the library is subject to wiretap compliance. 319  Because of the
potential cost to libraries and universities, and the power of the FCC to exempt
specific telecommunications carriers from compliance, library and university
associations have urged the FCC to consider their exemption from
compliance. 320
If libraries and universities become exempt from CALEA compliance, it
only saves money, not the potential sacrifice in privacy. 32 1 In order to avoid the
cost of compliance, some universities have opted to stop offering public Internet
access. 32 2 Regardless of their status under the Act, libraries and universities are
subject to government wiretap requests.32 3 Although the institutions may not
have CALEA compliant facilities, if they obtain Internet access through a
broadband service provider, communications within the university and library
network can still be accessed using the interception capabilities through the
service provider. 324
CALEA does have a safe harbor section that allows a maximum extension
of two years of the compliance deadline. 325 The safe harbor provision allows a
telecommunications carrier to petition for an extension if it has tried or is
currently implementing the required capabilities. 3 26 If petitioned, the FCC and
the Attorney General determine whether compliance is not reasonably
achievable through available technology within the compliance period.
327
Though the extension may be granted more than once, the extension only applies
316. Nate Anderson, CALEA: It Doesn't Apply to Universities and Libraries After All, ARS
TECHNICA, May 17, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070517-calea-it-doesnt-apply-to-
universities-and-libraries-after-all.html.
317. Id.
318. GIDARI, supra note 315, at 3; see also Anderson, supra note 312.
319. GIDARI, surpa note 315, at 3.
320. Id. at 3-4.
321. See generally Anderson, supra note 314 (discussing the costs required to upgrade
infrastructure in libraries and universities if not exempted and the fact that both groups are still
required to comply with government wiretap requests regardless of any exemption).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. GIDARI, surpa note 315, at 3.
325. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1006 (c)(3) (1994).
326. Id. § 1006(c)(1).
327. Id. § 1006(c)(2).
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to those parts of the telecommunication carrier's business on which the new
technology or compliance equipment is used. 328
VI. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WIRETAPPING POLICIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VOIP
WIRETAPPING.
A. The Danger to Privacy from CALEA and Blanket Implementation of
Wiretapping Capabilities
CALEA contains security and integrity requirements to protect the privacy
of callers who are not subject to law enforcement wiretaps and to all callers
when law enforcement personnel are not actively tapping communications.
329
Outlining the system security and integrity demands, the Act requires that:
[a] telecommunications carrier shall ensure that any interception of
communications or access of call-identifying information effected
within its switching premises can be activated only in accordance with a
court order or other lawful authorization and with the affirmative
intervention of an individual officer or employee of the carrier acting in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Commission.
3 30
Though section 1004 requires the communications carrier to ensure
activation only in accordance with a court order, the FBI has recognized and
sought to address additional areas of security breaches. 33 1  The FBI has
specifically petitioned the FCC to amend CALEA to include personnel security
measures and a measure requiring telecommunications carriers to report events
that are suspected to have compromised the security of the system. 33 It also
petitioned to add a section requiring the telecommunications carriers to record
the initiation of call interceptions. Finally, the FBI requested the FCC
reconsider a rejected amendment that would establish automated surveillance
328. Id. § 1006(c)(4).
329. See id. § 1004.
330. Id.
331. See Commc'ns Assist. for Law Enforcement Act, 16 F.C.C.R. 8959, 8960 (2001).
332. Id. at 8960; see generally BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 12 n.5 (explaining that the
FBI's concerns about security measures are in part warranted by a wiretapping scandal where an
unknown insider at Vodafone Corporation implemented a CALEA-Iike wiretap technology created
by Ericsson that intercepted the communications of Greek government ministers); see also John
Leyden, Vodafone Fined 676m Over Greek Wiretap Scandal, THE REGISTER, Dec. 15, 2006,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/12/15/voda-finedover-greek-wiretaps/ (explaining that the
cellular phone calls of Costas Karamanlis, the Prime Minister of Greece, were also illegally
monitored).
333. Commc'ns Assist., 16 F.C.C.R. at 8960.
2008]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
status messages. 334 Though the Commission rejected the proposals for increased
security measures and tracking measures for call interceptions, 335 the Chairman
of the FCC, Kevin J. Martin, indicated that the Commission will "continue [to
work] ... to address and overcome any challenges that stand in the way of
effective lawful electronic surveillance."33 6 In the same statement, Martin said,
"[r]esponding to the needs of law enforcement is of paramount importance."
33 7
Aside from ignoring potential security risks, CALEA also potentially
requires a change in VoIP technology. 338 Once initiated, communications traffic
flows directly between the two ends of the call. 339 The call does not continue to
travel through the VoIP provider,34 0 and it does not have to travel continuously
through the same path between the two ends of the connection. 34 1 One way law
enforcement could obtain wiretaps over a packet network is to require a provider
to direct traffic through a law enforcement intercept point.342 This option would
likely require the assistance and cooperation of a sizeable segment of the routing
infrastructure. 343  Though directing the packet traffic would allow law
enforcement better access and ability to wiretap VolP calls, it also allows others
access to the same traffic at the same point.344  Hacking into VolP
communications has been the subject of much discussion. 345 After the hacker
has access to the network and communication, his job is made easier by many
tools designed to intercept and record Internet traffic. 34 6  By channeling the
communication through specific networks and routers, the CALEA
accommodations give easy access to law enforcement and hackers alike. 347 In
fact, the Swiss Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and




335. Id. at 8960-66.
336. FCC REPORT, supra note 220, at 53 (statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin).
337. Id.
338. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 6-7.
339. Id. at 6.
340. Id.
341. See GOLENIEWSKI, supra note 8, at 96.
342. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9 at 12.
343. Id. at 13.
344. Id.
345. See generally ENDLER, supra note 296 (Jane K. Brownlow ed., McGraw Hill 2007)
(illustrating the example that entire books have been on the subject and measures to prevent it.).
346. Id. at 160-64.
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CALEA presents a further potential impact on privacy because of the nature
of Internet traffic. 350 The Act makes no differentiation in the type of electronic
communication that is subject to lawful wiretap. 35  Capturing conversations on
packet switch networks in real time means having to place the wiretap as near as
possible to the source or destination. 352 Because packets are not differentiated,
this requires either hardware or software capable of trapping all Internet traffic
coming through the designated choke point. 353 If the choke point is tapped in
this way, not only will the call be intercepted, but also all of the other traffic
from that Internet connection. 354 Although trapping all the Internet traffic from
one suspect connection could be justified under the current wiretapping
standards, the placement of the choke point could also mean that all the traffic
through a larger residential gateway is accessed, including the specified
connection and all others in the neighborhood.
355
CALEA is specific in its function, however, requiring telecommunications
carriers to build wiretap capabilities into the systems. Though this could limit
the need to tap an entire neighborhood's Internet gateway connection, it
intentionally places holes in a system. 357 The privacy protection allowed by this
method, as opposed to the gateway tap, presents opportunities for law
enforcement and hackers alike. 35  As an alternative to requiring a
telecommunications provider to put intentional interception capabilities in a
system, CALEA allows a telecommunications provider to outsource its
compliance to a trusted third party. 359 This technique requires routing traffic
p (last visited Apr. 8, 2008)(defining Spyware as "[s]oftware that sends information about your
Web surfing habits to its Web site.... [S]pyware transmits information in the background as you
move around the Web.").
349. John Leyden, Swiss Gov 'Mulls' Spyware to Tap VoIP Calls, THE REGISTER, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/10/1 0/swiss-voip-wiretapplan/ (explaining that a Swiss firm,
ERA IT Solutions, is attempting to keep its software, Superintendent Trojan, away from anti-virus
and anti-spyware lists, which commonly detect and eliminate spyware, by solely providing access
to the software to government agencies).
350. See BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9, at 13.
351. Id.; see also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1001-10
(2006).
352. Andrew Brandt, Privacy Watch: Listening in to Net Phone Conversations, PC WORLD,




356. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002-06.
357. See Brandt, supra note 352.
358. Id.
359. Anderson, supra note 310.
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through the third party. 36  As explained in the previous section, routing traffic
through a specific point creates just as much vulnerability to eavesdropping by
law enforcement as by hackers. 3 6 1 Regardless of third party routing, or built-in
compliance, because CALEA fails to address end-user encryption, it will be of
limited use as encryption by subscribers or end-users of VoIP communications
becomes more commonplace. 
362
B. The Need for Careful Legislation in the United States and Europe
CALEA has been "undeniably stretched to recognize new service
technologies and pushed very hard to accommodate new and emerging
telecommunications platforms. 3 63  The Act may require further stretching,
however, because the proposed rulemaking that expands it does not include peer-
to-peer communications. The proposed rulemaking separates VolP into two
categories: managed and non-managed. 365  Peer-to-peer communications fall
under the non-managed category that escapes compliance requirements. 3 66 The
distinction arose because peer-to-peer providers maintain minimal or no
involvement in packet flow during the communication. 367  The distinction
removes Skype and other peer-to-peer providers from CALEA's purview, and in
turn, eliminates the largest segment of VoIP subscribers from the wiretap
requirements. 368 Although some may think the Act's expansion means criminals
and terrorists who switch to VoIP will be easily caught, if they switch to a non-
managed or peer-to-peer communication, they will not have to worry about built
in interception technology. 369 The peer-to-peer exclusion combined with the
potential for encryption seems to denote a potential problem for law enforcement
wiretaps. 370
360. Id.
361. BELLOVIN ET AL., supra note 9 at 13.
362. 47 U.S.C. § 1002; see also Gohring, supra note 201.
363. FCC Report, supra note 220, at 55.
364. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND DECLARATORY
RULING, FCC 04-187, 18-20, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-




368. Skype Hits lOOM, supra note 26.
369. FCC PROPOSED RULE, supra note 364, at 19.
370. Gohring, supra note 201; see generally Shiping Chen et al., On the Anonymity and
Traceability of Peer-to-Peer VoIP Calls, 20 IEEE NETWORK: THE MAGAZINE FOR GLOBAL
INTERNETWORKING, Sept.- Oct. 2006, at 32-37.
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Although VolP calls may be traced even while encrypted, the call content
remains obscured from the view of law enforcement. 3 7 1 If the caller is able to
encrypt the communication, the call content will be confidential. 372 Though the
call may be traced, and call identifying information gathered, the call content
cannot be determined without the encryption keys, 373 unless the encryption is
broken. 374 This is where legislation like RIPA comes into play.375 RIPA allows
British law enforcement and intelligence services to demand decryption keys for
information residing in the UK, on English servers, or devices in Britain.
376
However, the UK statute still does not allow information gained in lawful
interceptions to be used in court. 3 7 7 There is a danger in this sort of legislation,
even if the information is not allowed in court. 378  Because of the danger of
abuse, legislation of this nature is likely to have an effect on the economy.379
International corporations and banks would be justifiably nervous if their
encryption could be compromised with a simple form request for disclosure.
380
The two fundamental differences between RIPA and CALEA create the
greatest need for careful legislation. 38 1  RIPA cannot be used in court as
evidence. 382 It can however, be used to require encryption/decryption keys from
either the criminal involved or any other party who may have the
encryption/decryption keys. 383 CALEA interceptions may be used in court, but
United States law enforcement agencies have no authority to demand
encryption/decryption keys from the possessing parties. 384 The right to demand
encryption/decryption keys has privacy implications that rival the privacy
problems of building back door wiretap capabilities into VoIP
371. CHEN ETAL., supra note 370, at 33.
372. Id.
373. See e.g. Gohring, supra note 201 (showing Zfone as an example of one VoIP encryption
method that protects encryption keys from those not party to the communication, making the
encryption more difficult to circumvent).
374. SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 31.
375. Peter Pollack, UK Wants Power to Demand Encryption Keys, ARS TECHNICA, May 18, 2006
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060518-6870.html.
376. Fisher, supra note 202.
377. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, ch. 23, §§ 17-18 (United Kingdom).
378. Fisher, supra note 202.
379. Id.
380. Pollack, supra note 375.
381. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act §§ 17-18, 49; see also Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2006).
382. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act § § 17-18.
383. Id. § 49.
384. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act §§ 100 1-10.
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communications. 3 85 Just as back door wiretap and interception capabilities may
be exploited by hackers or those inside law enforcement agencies, so too would
the ability to request encryption/decryption keys.
386
VII. GREASING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF TECHNOLOGY IN SURVEILLANCE
Though balancing privacy and government security interests presents a
daunting task to legislators and private citizens, some mistakenly view
ubiquitous encryption as a potentially easy solution to the problem. 387 A recent
article addressed the difficult balance between privacy and security with
references to quantum computing, quantum encryption, and law enforcement
alternatives to wiretapping, in a theorized landscape of pervasive encryption.
388
Although these references resonate with a certain technological sexual appeal,
they may not, in reality, live up to their appearances.389
The article indicates that quantum computers will render current encryption
schemes impotent. 390  Quantum computers, in theory, will be able to solve
problems in minutes that conventional computers would take infeasible amounts
of time to solve. 391 Regardless of the potential and theory, in reality, quantum
computers maintain a place in research facilities solving trivial problems.
392
These machines employ complex and delicate equipment, and have yet to be
produced in a commercially viable and scientifically accepted form.393 Simply
stated, most scientists in the field expect commercial quantum computers to
reach the market in fifty years.394
The article also asserts that turn-key quantum encryption solutions have
been released at a conference in 2005. 395 The quantum encryption referenced is
385. Pollack, supra note 375.
386. Id.
387. See Daniel J. Sherwinter, Surveillance's Slippery Slope: Using Encryption to Recapture
Privacy Rights, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 501, 528-29. [hereinafter Sherwinter].
388. Id. at 516-18, 526-29.
389. See e.g. Marina Gorbis & David Pescovitz, Bursting Tech Bubbles Before They Balloon,
IEEE SPECTRUM, Sept. 2006, at 55, available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/sepO6/4435; R. Colin
Johnson, Quantum Encryption Secures High-Speed Data Stream, E.E. TIMES, Nov. 07, 2002,
http://www.commsdesign.com/news/tech-beat/OEG20021107S0031 [hereinafter Quantum
Encryption Secures].
390. Sherwinter, supra note 387, at 517-19.
391. Jason Pontin, Q&A: D-Wave's Geordie Rose, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Apr. 6, 2007, at 1,
available at http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/l8495/pagel/?a=f. [hereinafter Pontin].
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Gorbis & Pescovitz, supra note 389, at 50.
395. Sherwinter, supra note 387, at 518.
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a key distribution system requiring optical networks. 396 Though an attractive
prospect, quantum cryptography has its share of problems. 397  Quantum
cryptography currently operates as a key distribution system, not a means to
encrypt the content of an entire message. 39 8  This means that quantum
cryptography must be used in conjunction with classical cryptography in order to
create cipher text.399 Though the encryption key may be transferred quickly and
securely enough to be unbreakable, the message is still subject to the deficiencies
of the classical encryption. 40 Another problem of quantum encryption is that it
provides no protection against man-in-the-middle attacks, a common form of
attack. 40 1  Vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks means essentially that,
although quantum encryption is safe from passive eavesdropping, an active
eavesdropper may impersonate the parties to the communication and gain access
to the contents as it passes through his system.40 2 Finally, the last problem with
quantum encryption is the required fiber optic network. 40 3 Although companies
are working on the problem, currently, quantum cryptography systems use
dedicated fiber optic lines instead of the active fiber optic network. 404 The cost
associated with running cryptographic systems on dedicated lines is prohibitive
for almost any consumer. Unless the problems and costs associated with
396. R. Colin Johnson, Quantum Encryption Enters Product Phase, E.E. Times, Apr. 28, 2005,
at 44. [hereinafter R. Colin Johnson] (explaining that Quantum encryption systems require optic
networks because they employ particles of light in differing energy states to replace ones and
zeroes in typical encryption systems.) Nicolas Gisin, et. al, Quantum Cryptography 74 REVIEWS
OF MODERN PHYSICS 145,149-152 (2002), available at
http://astro.swarthmore.edu/comps/Gisin-quantum-crypto.pdf. [hereinafter Gisin].
397. Alex Salkever, A Quantum Leap in Cryptography, BUSINESS WEEK, July 15, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2003/tc203715-5818-tc047.htm; see also
Gisin, supra note 396, at 12-20.
398. R. Colin Johnson, supra note 396, at 44.
399. Id.
400. See Quantum Encryption Secures High-Speed Data Stream, supra note 389. This quantum
encryption scheme weakness means that if the classical encryption method that encodes the
message can be broken in a matter of hours, no matter how secure the key transfer, the message is
still vulnerable. Id.
401. See James Ford, Quantum Cryptography Tutorial (1996),
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/-jford/crypto.html#2.
402. Bruce Schneier, Hold the Photons!, WIRED.COM, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2005/12/69841.
403. Brad Grimes, Taking Aim at Distance, Cost of Quantum Crypto, GOVERNMENT COMPUTER
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quantum cryptography can be properly addressed, it is unlikely these systems
will be available for widespread use in the near future.
406
Even though law enforcement agents are not hindered by quantum
encryption, ubiquitous encryption could force them to use alternatives to
407wiretapping in order to find evidence. Although encryption may force their
use, these alternatives may not effectively garner call content information from
VolP communications. 4 08  Sherwinter's paper references the technique of
monitoring electromagnetic signals broadcast from a computer's monitor.40 9
This method of surveillance is called Van Eck Phreaking. 4 1 Van Eck Phreaking
allows a person to view the information displayed on another's screen from a
distance, even through walls. 4 1  As intriguing as this electromagnetic
surveillance may be, this technique cannot circumvent VolP encryption or gather
call content information because conversations do not appear on the screen.412
Additional options that may actually circumvent encryption, like spyware and
Trojans, have unique limitations that may negate their effectiveness. 4 13
Employing spyware as an alternative to wiretapping requires not only the
participation of government agencies but also from operating system and anti-
spyware software companies, and may open new vulnerabilities within systems
and communications. W4 Most of the wiretapping alternatives that offer the
contents of communications require physical or logical access to the computer
415
406. Id.
407. Bert-Jaap Koops, The Crypto Controversy: A Key Conflict in the Information Society,
KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, 1, 207 (1999), available at
http://rechten.uvt.nl/koops/THESIS/thesis.htm. [hereinafter Koops].
408. See id. at 207.
409. Sherwinter, supra note 387, at 529.
410. Posting of Jonathan Grover, About Van Eck Phreaking,
http://the.jhu.edu/upe/2004/03/23/about-van-eck-phreaking/ (Mar. 23, 2004)(on file with author).
411. Id.
412. Posting of Russell Shaw, "They" Can Spy on Your IM and VoIP Conversations - Through
Walls!, http:/Iblogs.zdnet.com/ip-telephony/?p=1553 (Apr. 20, 2007, 23:00)(on file with author)
(explaining that essentially although IM messages appear on the computer screen, VolP
conversations are similar to a telephone call, the conversation is oral and never appears on the
screen, therefore Van Eck Phreaking is ineffective in terms eavesdropping on these calls).
413. See Posting of Tim Lee, German Proposal Gives a New Perspective on 'Spyware',
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20071126/174251.shtml (Nov. 27, 2007, 17:10)(on file with
author).
414. Id.
415. See e.g. id; Koops, supra note 407, at 207; Michael Le May & Jack Tan, Acoustic
Surveillance of Physically Unmodified PCs, at 1-3, (Las Vegas, NV, June 26-29, 2006)(
Proceedings of the 2006 International Conference on Security & Management, SAM 2006)(copy
of paper on file with the Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law).
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which exposes law enforcement agents to increased probability of detection,
thereby decreasing their viability as alternatives to wiretapping.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fundamental differences between RIPA and CALEA highlight the
difference between the United Kingdom and the United States and their
respective commitments to privacy and government intervention.4 17  The
English requirement that a wiretap be signed only by a designated law
enforcement official gives broader latitude to communication interceptions in the
United Kingdom. 4 1  United States law enforcement communication
interceptions require narrow judicial approval and greater specificity than their
British counterparts. 4 19 These requirements were recognized by FBI director
Louis J. Freeh as statutory protections where "Congress fashioned a
comprehensive electronic surveillance framework that carefully balanced the
communications security needs and privacy rights of individuals with the needs
of law enforcement to fulfill its duty to protect the public and enforce the
law."
, 4 20
Even though CALEA extended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act, there is danger in the extension much past its current state. 42  As it
stands, members of the FCC understand that CALEA needs change and tailoring
to better fit the changing technologies without infringing on the rights of
• . 422
citizens. There is a need for Congressional clarification of the reach of
CALEA; 42 3 however, there is also a need for caution in that extension and• .,- .. 424
clarification. Though the FCC engaged in, and will continue to engage in,
employing its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I,425 the debate between the
416. See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 42, at 295-99.
417. Compare Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act § 1002, and Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.§ 2511 (2006), with Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act Part II § 32.
418. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. § 32.
419. Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 2511, and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §1802, and Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002, with Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act Part 11 § 32.
420. Freeh, supra note 28, at 3 (referring to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968
§§ 2510-2521).
421. FCC REPORT, supra note 220, at 55.
422. See id. at 54.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 55.
425. Id. at 56.
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government's right to intercept communications and the fight of privacy is
growing increasingly heated. 426  The extension of CALEA and the RIPA
encryption sections resemble laws passed by legislators that fail to understand
the technology being regulated. 427 Though law enforcement needs tools such as
wiretapping to perform their jobs, the leniency of regulations 428 allows these
tools to be misused. 429 It is the misuse of proper law enforcement techniques
and the Machiavellian national interest that could pave a path between the
current incarnation of CALEA and an Orwellian future in the vein of 1984 where
the government has "the power to keep its citizens under constant
surveillance."
430
426. Gohring, supra note 201.
427. Pollack, supra note 375.
428. FCC REPORT, supra note 220.
429. Pollack, supra note 375.
430. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 335 (Oxford University Press 1984) (1949).
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